Introduction
The recent Egyptian revolution of January 25, 2011 was widely perceived as different from those of the old age, particularly, due to an innovative use of social networks and modern electronic media as instruments of empowerment and mobilization, which turned a protest rally in in Cairo's Tahrir Square into a multimodal mass communication event. Egyptian revolutionaries, who picked up the torch from the successful Tunisian antecedent, had thereby inaugurated the so called Arab Springa series of anti-government uprisings and protests across the Arab countries. The word spring (rabī') metaphorically signified renewal and breakaway from the past. International media eagerly and enthusiastically embarked on the production of a media story of democratic change sweeping all over the Middle East. Not only the left-leaning activists, but sober policy makers in the leading Western democracies, for all their trademark cautiousness, were operating on an essential similar reading of the Arab Spring 1 . However, should the enthusiastic supporters of the Egyptian revolution abroad be able to understand the native language and willing to listen, they would probably find the verbal manifestation of this highly ingenious and unu-________________ sually massive protest movement astonishingly conservative, when it comes to the beliefs and knowledge bases embedded in it.
The discourse of the revolution was built around a coherent set of concepts, some of which we have analyzed in a series of previous publications. This conceptual framework included many concepts that either were overtly Islamic or, though appearing superficially lay, were in fact linked intrinsically to the religious and religiously inspired ideological discourses. The discourse of the revolution had been set in motion by a dynamic semantic structure representing the scenario of the Revolution as seen by its participants and sympathizers, which we henceforth will refer to as revolutionary narrative. This revolutionary narrative was rather simple: it represented the Revolution as purposeful forward-going movement of the Egyptian People powered by the People's Will (Irādat aš-ŠA'B) and aiming at bringing down the State of Injustice (Dawlat aẓ-Ẓ ULM) 2 , whose defeated henchmen (FULŪL 3 ) had to be marginalized (iqṣā') cleared off (taṭhīr) 4 , punished and thereby the innocent blood of the martyrs of the revolution (Šuhadā' aṯ-Ṯawra) and the poor and oppressed (Maẓlūmūn), who suffered from injustice (Ẓ ULM) be avenged through retaliation (QIṢ ĀṢ ) 5 . In each particular text instantiating the revolutionary discourse one may find elements of this narrative with the whole variety of texts complementing each other in recreating the story of the Revolution over and over again. The narrative was designed to provide a sense of destination to multiple human efforts collective and individual and helped people make sense of the messy flow of events.
While our previous publications aimed at describing core elements of the revolutionary discourse as it normally functioned, our focus in the present study will be on what happens at the time of its imminent collapse. While instances of the revolutionary discourse bearing its definitive features as described above could be traced even to the early president Sisi period (2014) , since 2013 the Egyptian political life took a dramatic U-turn, which made the triumphalist revolutionary narrative suddenly irrelevant and the dominant position that the pro-revolution voices had on the Egyptian media scene impossible to sustain. The defeat of the revolutionaries, however, had not affected an immediately rise of a new type of discourse, and even ________________ though in reality the military appeared to have won the battle for power, their new authoritarian regime still had long way to go in winning the legitimacy and adjusting the public discursive domain to its needs.
The collapse of the revolutionary narrative
The emergence on the political scene of a massive protest movement Tamarrud (Rebellion) 6 in June 2013 signified a profound split in the Egyptian revolutionary camp 7 . On the discursive plane it meant that the signifier ṯuwār (revolutionaries) now had not one but several conflicting referents. The Tamarrud movement affectively paved the ground for the military coup of 3 July 2013, which overthrew Egypt's first democratically elected president. In the aftermath of the coup, many activists who participated in January 25 revolution were thrown into jails or killed on the streets of Cairo during the Muslim Brotherhood-led anti-coup protests. These developments affected change in the scheme of power relations, and the one embedded in the revolutionary narrative and reflected in such concepts as FULŪL, which depicted counter-revolutionary forces as a weakened and defeated enemy, now also was at odds with the new political reality. The offensive modality of the revolutionary narrative suddenly became irrelevant and those voices in the public discussion domain that remained defiant in their support of the president Mursi had to re-group and re-formulate their public discourse, while the 'revolutionary youth' of Tamarrud were even more confused when their leaders had been also arrested in the wake of the coup over violation of a newly adopted anti-demonstrations law 8 . Those who remained defiant in the face of the coup projected their protests as a continuation or completion of the original January 25 revolution, hence their new self-identification as mukammilūn (completers). An anti-coup Muslim Brotherhood driven protest movement emerged under the banner of the National Alliance in Support of the Legitimacy (at-taḥāluf al-waṭanī li-da'm aš-šar'īya) . The word šar'īya (legality, legitimacy) thus became a key marker of the language of the Muslim Brotherhoodled protests. Struggle for Legitimacy (šar'īya) and against the coup (inqilāb) now became the lead theme of a new narrative, which replaced the old triumphalist narrative of revolution for many of those who still continued to call themselves Revolutionaries (ṯuwār). The movement aimed to force president Mursi to resign and call snap elections by collecting 15 million signatures by 30 June 2013, the one-year anniversary of Mursi's inauguration, and claimed to have collected over 22 million signatures in support of these demands. 7 The Tamarrud had effectively brought to a head a process, which some local observers described to us as a 'great secular -Islamist split', which had been particularly aggravated during Muslim Brotherhood affiliated president Mursi rule.
8 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46609&Cr=egypt&Cr1=#.WI9FwdJ95dg
Going global… and more Islamic
A violent crackdown by the coup authorities on a massive sit-in camp in Rābi'a al-'Adawiya square in Cairo, which for its participants represented a flashback of January 25, 2011 Tahrir square protests, marked a turning point in the course of the post-revolutionary history. In these new circumstances, which to many meant the victory of counter-revolution (aṯ-ṯawra al-muḍadda) and the comeback of the State of Injustice (dawlat aẓ-ẓulm) 9 , the old revolutionary narrative became altogether irrelevant even for the Islamists, who eagerly adopted it in the aftermath of Mubarak's downfall and made it part of the official discourse during the president Mursi's brief rule. For the defiant supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood the events of Rābi'a had now largely eclipsed in their collective memory and political symbolism the January 2011 Tahrir square protests. The more recent dramatic event has come to be referred simply as Rābi'a, and the date of a violent crackdown on the sit-in rally has been since commemorated every year. The events of Rābi'a have inspired a four-finger salute, which became a new symbol of defiance for the supporters of the deposed president Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood 10 , for rābi'a originally means an ordinal number 'forth' in Arabic 11 . In contrast to 2011 Tahrir square sit-in, which in the discourse of January 25 revolution was interpreted as a metaphor of national unity, the Rābi'a events were framed by Muslim Brotherhood supporters in a global pan-Muslim, rather than a national perspective, cf.:
rābi'a hiya ramz al-ḥurriya, rābi'a hiya maẖāḍ li-wilādat ḥarakat ḥurriya wa 'adāla jadīda, rābi'a hiya bašāra li-wilādat al-'ālam al-jadīd, rābi'a hiya burūz al-muslimīn min jadīd fī as-sāḥa ad-duwaliya, rābi'a ta'nī al-'adāla wa al-ḥurriya wa ar-raḥma, rābi'a hiya man inhārāt amām a'tābihā al-qiyam al-ġarbiya az-zā'ifa 12 Rābi'a is a symbol of freedom, Rābi'a is a travail for the birth of a new movement of freedom and justice, Rābi'a is a good news of the birth of a new world, Rābi'a is the appearance of the Muslims again on the international scene, Rābi'a means justice and freedom and mercy, Rābi'a is [she] who the false Western values have fallen on her doorstep. ________________ 9 On the significance of this notion in the revolutionary discourse cf. Bogomolov, A. 2016. "A necessary evil: the conept of Zulm in Arab political discourse and its historic roots". Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia XVI. 7-39. 10 The symbol represents a hand with four fingers raised and the thumb drawn across the palm; graphically the symbol is often styled as a rectangular black on yellow road warning sign.
11 The square is a site of a mosque dedicated to an 8 th cent. CE Muslim female 'saint' and Sufi mystic, who was so named for she was the fourth child in her family. 12 From the text of a proclamation called 'What is Rābi'a?' (mā hiya Rābi'a) -http://vb.3dlat. net/showthread.php?t=189028
Obviously, the text draws alludes to the key slogan of January 25 revolutionBread, Freedom, Social Justice, Human Dignity 13 -but it also reinforces its Islamic connotation by augmenting a religious concept of raḥma (mercy).
Key elements that survived from the revolutionary discourse
The decline of the original revolutionary discourse, however, does not mean that all its elements have become irrelevant. The theme of RETALIATION (QIṢĀS) continues even now although the context has changed. Cf. the following rejoinder attributed to a prominent Muslim Brotherhood member:
bi-ḥasb ḥamza zawba 'aḥad qiyādāt al-iẖwān fī al-ẖārij wa allaḏī aḍāf anna: 'al-muṣālaḥa laysat bi-yad ayy faṣīl, bal bi-yad aš-ša'b wa awliyā' ad-dam (ḏuī al-qatlā) wa ahālī al-mu'taqalīn (as-sujanā') wa al-muṣābīn wa al-mušarradīn 14 … according to Hamza Zawba, one of the leaders of the Brotherhood abroad, who added that: 'the reconciliation is not in the hands (lit. hand) of whatever group, but in the hands of the people and the next of kin (relatives of the slain -A.B.) and families of those in custody (the prisoners) and the injured and the displaced The Muslim Brotherhood functionary clearly implies the power of the next of kin to demand QIṢĀS for their slain relatives according to the Sharia norms 15 . By extending these powers to the entire Egyptian people the speaker is replaying the same rhetorical ruse as the revolutionaries when they tried to challenge the authorities by invoking the powerful concept of retaliation. The topic of muṣālaḥa (reconciliation), which became a prominent theme of debate between the government, the civil society and the families of activists incarcerated in the aftermath of the coup, represents another reference to the traditional norms. According to Muslim custom, one way of peacefully settling a dispute between the two conflicting sides that emerge in the aftermath of a violent crime, which are in a prototypical situation represented by the families of the victim and the offender, -is through achieving an agreement called ṣulḥa (a derivative of ṣulḥ 'peace'). The reciprocal 6 th form muṣālaḥa, which in English translation is usually rendered as 'reconciliation', essen-________________ 13 Also, of course, to the name of the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing -Freedom and Justice Party.
14 'Fi'a ṯāliṯa bi-miṣr.. qulūbuhum fī as-sujūn wa 'uyūnuhum 'alā al-muṣālaḥa' (Third class in Egypt: their hearts in prisons and their eyes on the reconciliation). Huffington Post Arabic, 28 November 2016 -http://www.huffpostarabi.com/2016/11/28/story_n_13278628.html 15 "And whoever is killed unjustly, we have given his executor power, but let him not exceed limits in killing. Indeed, he has been supported" (Quran 17: 33) -cf. Bogomolov, A. 2015. "An eye for an eye and the struggle for power in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring". Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia XV. p. 29.
tially means a mutual ṣulḥa. Ṣulḥa. Such settlement is intended to avoid a chain of mutual relations between the affected clans ordinarily by way of letting the offender's relatives pay an agreed amount of material compensation (diya) for the victim's blood, a practice meant to be a substitute for QIṢĀS. The recent emphasis on muṣālaḥa, therefore, throws light on the policy of massive arrests in the aftermath of the coup: authorities were effectively creating a bargaining chip for the subsequent negotiations acknowledging thereby the people's QIṢĀS, which represented a key element of the revolutionary discourse, as indeed a formidable challenge to their power, just as we have concluded in our analysis before 16 . In the hot public debate pro and contra muṣālaḥa the continued suffering (mu'ānā) of the prisoners is clearly weighed against the imperative of QIṢĀṢ: ṭālamā laysat ladayka ru'ya li-istirdād ḥaqq aš-šuhadā' wa lā li-ẖurūj al-mu'taqalīn fa-laysa min ḥaqqik an ta'tariḍ 'alā ayy mubādara yakūn fīhā ḥall li-ẖurūj al-mu'taqalīn mabda'iyyan 17 As soon as you don't have a vision for the reinstating the rights of the martyrs (i.e. the right of the next of kin to avenge their blood -A.B.) and neither for the release (lit. exit) of the prisoners, you don't have the right to object to any initative containg the solution for the release of prisoners in principle
The revolutionary power of the imperative of QIṢĀṢ is undermined in the official discourse of Sisi's Egypt by replacing its referents. It is now mainly servicemen, either as casualties of the war on Islamist militants in Sinai or victims of alleged terrorist acts in Cairo, who are called martyrs (šuhadā') and whose blood now calls for QIṢĀṢ in the official media. QIṢĀṢ, on the other hand, has now become a central theme in the public messages of various clandestine militant groups, which take responsibility for sporadic acts of terror targeting government officials; one such group even calls itself Ḥarakat al-QIṢĀṢ (Retaliation Movement) 18 . The official media are also exploiting the same concept and even the style that used to be characteristic of the revolutionary discourse in waging their verbal war on the militants, cf. a newspaper headline: ahālī al-maḥmūdiya yuṭālibūna bi-l-QIṢĀṢ min ḥarakat ḥasm al-irhābiya 19 (citizenry of Madmudiya are demanding retaliation against the terrorist Resolve Momevent). QIṢĀS has thus become a contested notion in this ________________ 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. a Facebook post cited as an apparently strong argument in favor of muṣālaḥa; consider also the subtitle of the appropriate part of the article -muṣālaḥa muqābil al-ḥurriya (Reconciliation in exchange for freedom), in which reconciliation is juxtaposed to what appears to be an undisputed value, implying that reconciliation is in fact a negative thing -a forced concession, a moral sacrifice or a least evil solution. 18 To be sure, while the revolutionary narrative prevailed in the public discussion for a period of about three years, there always had been a counter narrative, generated by the acolytes of the Ancien Régime whom the revolutionaries called FULŪL. While detailed analysis of this counter narrative is outside of the scope of this study, data available to us suggests that, as it usually happens in the context of contentious political discourses, this counter narrative uses various word games and puns to construct a meta-cultural commentary on key value concepts of the target narrative. One characteristic case in point is use of the word ẖarāyib (ruins), modeled on the syllabic structure of the word yanāyir (January) 20 , which had been used as a common short name for the January Revolution (ṯawrat yanāyir). To the best of our knowledge, such vernacular mocking language has not penetrated the official media discourse, but had certainly gained more ground in the more colloquial forms of public discussion in the aftermath of the coup 21 . On a more formal plain, similar to the situation in Ukraine in the aftermath of the Orange revolution of 2004, there always had been and continues to be an expert discussion on whether or not January 25 had indeed been a revolution, with those who deny the applicability of the term suggesting alternative definition such as uprising ('iṣyān) or even coup (inqilāb). While voices of those in denial had been weakened or hushed, when the revolutionary narrative prevailed, in the wake of the coup they became more confident. Nowadays, according to local observers, the word revolution (ṯawra) in reference to January 25 events is being cautiously avoided in public discussion even by many of those, who had eagerly identified with revolution, and replaced by alternative terms, often simply referred to as aḥdāṯ yanā'ir (events of January). The popular uprising of June 2013 that led to the ousting of president Mursi was also presented as another Egyptian revolution or as the completion of the one that began in January 25, again diluting the reference scope of the original revolutionary narrative. Those, who remained defiant immediately took to calling it coup, which had also contributed to undermining the conceptual pact 22 among a wide cross-section of the Egyptian society that emerged in early 2011 in the wake of Tahrir square sit-in and the ________________ 20 It is effectively a contamination or an imperfect pun, for the discussion of this and other types of ludic transformations cf. Lennon, P. 2011. "Ludic language: the case of the punning echoic allusion". Brno Studies in English. Vol. 37, No. 1. p. 82. 21 We are grateful to our Egyptian informants for bringing this phenomenon to our attention. 22 For the notion of conceptual pact cf. Another theme that did not go away and remained salient in the post-revolutionary discourse of defiance was dawlat aẓ-ẒULM (the State of Injustice). At the onset of pro-Mursi rallies in the aftermath of the coup the protesters even coined a specific chant designed to challenge the State of Injustice: 'umru ẓ-ẓulm mā 'awwam dawla (col. Egyptian, never had ẒULM established a state) 23 . In contrast to the revolutionary narrative, which depicted the revolution as a struggle of ṮUWĀR (revolutionaries) against FULŪL, it is now the State of Injustice itself that has become their powerful antagonist, and the revolutionaries are not the triumphant winners but victims of ẒULM, their inactivity (and on the pragmatic plain, also an indirect invitation for the addressee to show compassion to them) is reflected in the use of such nominations as abnā' aṯ-ṯawra (sons of the revolution) instead of ṯuwār, cf.:
wa 'indamā ataḥaddaṯ 'an dawlat aẓ-ẓulm fī al-maqāl al-awwal yalīh 'adad min al-maqālāt taḥt 'unwān dawlat aẓ-ẓulm wa awwal man ataḥaddaṯ 'anhum hum abnā' aṯ-ṯawra al-miṣriyya rufaqā' an-nidāl allaḏīna yata'arraḍūna li-ẓ-ẓulm li-annahum arādū an yataḥaddū al-fasād wa al-istibdād allatī ta'īšūh miṣr 'alā madār as-sanawāt al-aẖīra jā'ū li-yarfa'ū aẓ-ẓulm fa-ẓulimū wa hum akṯar an-nās al-ān allaḏīna yata'arraḍūna li-ẓ-ẓulm dāẖil as-sujūn al-miṣriyya
24
And when I talk about the state of injustice in the first article [which is] followed by a number of articles under the heading 'The State of Injustice', the first who I talk about are the sons of the Egyptian revolution, comrades in struggle, who are subjected to ẒULM for they wanted to challenge the corruption and despotism, which Egyp is living through over the course of last years, [they] came to eliminate (lit. raise) ẒULM and were wronged (subjected to ẒULM) and they [are now] the ones who are subjected to ẒULM the most in the Egyptian prisons.
Standard metaphors of personification are deployed to depict the State of Injustice as monolithic entity, often a carnivorous beast, e.g. tajdīd ḥabs as-salāmūnī yu'akkid anna dawlat aẓ-ẓulm lam tašba' min laḥm abnā' miṣr ba'd (the extended [term of] detention for Salamuni proves that the State of Injustice is not sated yet with the flesh of the sons of Egypt). The renewed theme of the State of Injustice brings back the unending debate over the role of religion as a source of legitimacy:
________________ wa ġadan sa-takūn nihāyat al-inqilāb wa taqayyud al-ḥurriyāt wa aẓ-ẓulm li-anna dawlat aẓ-zulm sa-tazūl ḥattā wa law kānat muslima wa dawlat al-'adl sa-tabqā ẖālida ḥattā wa law kānat kāfira wa li-anna hā'ulā' al-mujrimīn al-qatala as-saffāhīn laysū miṣriyīn wa lā muslimīn fa-dīnuhum wa waṭanuhum as-sulṭa wa al-māl illā anna naṣru aḷḷāhi qarīb 25 And tomorrow will be the end of the coup and the restriction of freedoms and ẒULM for the State of Injustice will disappear if even it were [a] Muslim [one] and the State of Justice will remain eternal (lit. immortal) even if it were [an] infidel [one] 26 , for these criminals, murderers, slaughterers are not Egyptians and neither Muslims, for their religion and their homeland is power and money, but Allah's victory is near
The manner, in which the State of Injustice is supposed to end, i.e. it will 'disappear' and the 'eternal' nature of the State of Justice, which will come in its stead, sound as a flashback of the REVOLUTION as MIRACLE frame, characteristic for the revolutionary narrative, which we discussed elsewhere 27 . The immediacy of the aspired relief from ẒULM, which this segment implies, is also reminiscent of the theme of speediness in relation to QIṢĀṢ 28 , pointing to a common cultural premise underlying such beliefs. The segment also reflects the notion of Muslim state as that, whose rulers are Muslims, which is apparently shared by both the ruling elite in its attempt to legitimize their grip on power and the defiant activists of a clearly Islamist persuasion.
Unlike QIṢĀṢ, this theme, in view of a strong cognitive link that exists between the concepts of ẒULM and POWER, appears to be difficult or even impossible to reappropriate for the newly re-established authoritarian regime. As a search item on Google Trends dawlat aẓ-zulm peaked on September 2013 coinciding with couple weeks after the violent crackdown on pro-Mursi protest rallies in Rābi'a al-'Adawiya square and November 2014, days after another violent crackdown on student protests of mid-October 2014 29 yā dawlat aẓ-ẓulm, isma'ī āna al-awān li-tadma'ī (…) aṭ-ṭiflu māta bi-ẖanqa wa aš-šayẖu māta bi-midfa' (…) al-'adlu kunti makānahu wa aẓ-ẓulmu fīki a tafza 'ī?
32 O, state of injustice, listen, the time has come for you to weap (…) the child died of strangling and the old man died of a cannon [fire] (…) you have replaced the justice (lit. the justice you were in place of it) and ẒULM is in you, don't you fret?
A popular hashtag on Twitter 'Mursi is still the president' 33 continues to promote the idea that president Mursi will return to bring the State of Injustice to its end. The idea sounds as a flashback of a messianic myth, which impression is reinforced by the inclusion of devotional elements invoking the Quranic story of the miraculous salvation of Jonas 34 , cf.:
yā aḷḷāh man ḥafiẓta yūnis fī baṭn al-ḥūt, yā aḷḷāh iḥfiẓ 'abdaka muḥammad mursī mi aydi aẓ-ẓālimīn quḍāt al-askar Here is another characteristic segment discussing Mursi's plight attributed to a prisoners' rights activists: ________________ 30 A classical form of Arab poetry. 31 This author is described as young preacher and sheikh (ad-dā'iya aš-šābb šayẖ) cf. http://www. forsanhaq.com/showthread.php?t=367238 32 The poem was posted on the web on 21 August, 2013, days after the violent crackdown on the anti-Mursi protests, for the full text cf. http://www.forsanhaq.com/showthread.php?t=372985 33 #defg‫_ا‬jkg_lmfn (Mursi is still the president); the hashtag was active at least through mid-2016. 34 Jonas' story of captivity in the belly of a fish and miraculous salvation is recounted in It is notable that Mursi here is praised for what he didn't do rather than for something that he actually did, effectively for not being a Tyrant (Ẓālim, Ṭāġiya), which invokes the concept of ẒULM as the key theme of the Revolution. The power of the divine ordainment in the post-coup discourse of defiance is juxtaposed to the power of mundane authorities and the religious myth as a counter narrative to that of the official discourse of the oppressive regime. The post-revolutionary discourse of defiance, hence, continues to find a source of inspiration and empowerment in the same conservative religious values as in the original revolutionary discourse. Religious theme in the context of an obvious retreat (if not a complete defeat) of the revolution, as the above cited segments suggest, are mainly invoked in support of promises or threat, i.e. effectively as counterfactuals, meaning that as an instrument of discursive empowerment they are not as powerful as the demands for retaliation had been at the peak of the revolution.
Arab discourse of Resistance as the Revolution's fallback symbolic resource
The revolutionaries, who remained defiant in the aftermath of the coup, tried to hold on to whatever was left of their diminishing resources, including the discursive ones, and mobilize more support by stepping up tactics of protest that proved efficient during the January 25 revolution of which the sit-in protest camp in Rābi'a was the most characteristic example. On the discursive plain, the new discourse of defiance used more of the same religious rhetoric but also tapped on other sources, such as the powerful Arab discourse of Resistance, originally developed by Arab nationalist and leftist movements and hardened through decades of confrontation with Israel and the West. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supporters were not the first among the Islamist movements to tap on this discursive powerhouse, as other re-________________ 36 http://www.fj-p.com/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=97163 gional Islamists groups, such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hizbullah, had long ago adjusted the once strictly secular discourse of Resistance to their needs.
As any well-developed strand of political discourse, the discourse of Arab Resistance has its characteristic set of concepts and elaborate narratives, reflecting a history of ideological influences and reflective engagement with turbulent political events. But, just as the Egyptian revolutionary discourse, at its core it has a basic narrative structure, whose underlying schema is relatively simple: it could be described as struggling against an overwhelming force. As modern as the discourse of Resistance may seem, it is no less culturally idiosyncratic and grounded in deeply embedded cultural premises similar to the religious discourses that contributed to the January 25 revolutionary discourse. A thorough analysis of this discourse would go well beyond the scope and purpose of this study, we will, therefore, constrain ourselves below to the analysis of its single most important concept -ṢUMŪD. The concept refers to what could be described as a key moral and physical quality or inner resource, which helps embattled militants resist an assaulting force more powerful than themselves. It is not accidental, therefore, that the concept, which we saw no trace of at the peak of the revolutionary discourse, was reclaimed by the defiant Egyptian revolutionaries, once they confronted an overwhelming opponent.
Although ṢUMŪD has now become a staple of political discourse all over the Arab World, for the Arab political mind it continues to be linked to a single placePalestine, the launchpad of the ideology and the discourse of MUQĀWAMA (RESISTANCE). Once the narrative of January 25 revolution had lost its spell, the remaining defiant protagonists of the revolutionary epic needed a new narrative of defiance that would help raise the morale and mobilize the loyal constituencies in the face of an overwhelming and often very violent force. The revolution's shattered manpower needed replenishment, and so did its symbolic arsenal. It does not appear to be accidental that the discourse of Resistance, which dominated Arab politics for decades, would come up as a useful resource base for the much needed symbolic reinforcement. Of the discourse of Resistance, it is the concept of ṢUMŪD that appeared to be particularly fitting the post-coup context in Egypt. ṢUMŪD is not merely the most salient among the concepts in the discourse of Resistance, but also the one that helps make sense of the rationale, sources of inspiration and the political practice of resistance to an overwhelming force, which, when projected on the Egyptian reality, helped structure the everyday reality of the ongoing protest and empower its participants.
During but even more so, after the violent crackdown, Rābi'a emerged as a key symbol of resistance to the coup while the concept of ṢUMŪD provided a clue to converting this dramatic and painful experience into a political asset, a source of inspiration and empowerment for the protesters. Rābi'a inspired both the main graphic symbol and the verbal slogans of the ensuing anti-coup movement. Here is an example of a chant used at rallies in 2014: rābi'a ramz aṣ-ṣumūd 'āšū rigāla wa ilā insān lā yamlik min amr nafsihi wa ġayrihi šay'an! ayy qahr wa ẓulm yaš'ar bihi hāḏā ar-rajul? 45 ṢUMŪD of this president in the face of all these hardships, bargaining and examinations -from the top of the hierarchy as he had been president ordering and forbidding (an idiom meaning having an ultimate authority -A.B.) in all small and big [things] The segment reflects an extraordinary tension that the religious mind must feel confronted with so much hope being invested in a concept that refers to the human inner powers, which for a religious mind constitute the divinity's exclusive domain, yet, unlike other key elements of the discourse of defiance is not grounded in neither normative, nor the devotional Islamic discourses. The dilemma is being resolved here with the help of an interpretative frame characteristic for religious discourses, which may be formulated as GOOD is GOD's GIFT. Through this interpretation the human capacity to sustain external pressure is granted a divine sanction and the divine power is invoked in its support.
________________ 45 Op-ed article titled al-umma al-islāmiya tuḥayyi ṣumūd ar-ra'īs mursī (Islamic umma salutes president Mursi's ṢUMŪD) -http://old.egyptwindow.net/ar_print.aspx?print_ID=36558 46 We use the term force here in a metalinguistic sense, as in Talmy, L. 1968. "Force dynamics in language and cognition". Cognitive Science 12, 49-100. ṢUMŪD is conceptualized as a force sufficient to keep in check the tendency of ẒULM to advance. 47 The absence of stable collocations with abnā (sons of either revolution or the Egyptian people), which we have noted above, is another evidence of this connection -it could be accounted for by ṢUMŪD's propensity to combine with nominations referring to active/powerful parties. 48 http://marsadpress.net/?p=15999
Conclusions
Discourse is best understood as an act of communication involving multiple social actors. Social actors are not, however, speakers in the usual sense of the term, but groups or classes of people, which do not, strictly speaking, engage in anything similar to a conversation, even though discourse is sustained by what appears to be contributions of individual speakers. It is a communicative act mediated by social structures, which operates more as a repository of knowledge and remains active in as much as there remains a sufficient (socially significant) number of users, who both contribute to and tap on the symbolic resources that it contains. From a sociopragmatic perspective, discourse serves above all a social function of creating and maintaining consensuses and coherence of collective action. The narrative of the January 25 revolution reflected a consensus among multiple social groups regarding the meaning of Revolution, values that had inspired and driven them and, importantly, regarding their respective roles. The narrative of the revolution and its underlying conceptual framework resulted from a conceptual pact 49 among a broad crosssection of the Egyptian society that emerged through their joint engagement in and support of the January 2011 Tahrir square protests, -an event, which became a key point of reference in the ensuing public debate. By 2013, with growing disagreement between various classes of revolutionaries, particularly, the secular and Islamist groups, and the changing power relations, this conceptual pact had shrunk and crumbled and the original broad consensus could not be sustained anymore. The transformation that affected the set of protagonists of the revolutionary narrative, described by local observers as the 'great secular -Islamist rift', occurred not in the language but in political reality, and resulted in the rise of several alternative voices and narratives supplanting the single revolutionary narrative. The collapse of a coherent and simple revolutionary narrative and the demise of the revolutionary discourse all together signified the (re)emergence of fault lines within the society, which could not fit anymore into the simplistic scheme 'PEOPLE vs. REGIME', underlying the original revolutionary narrative. When the revolutionary discourse collapsed, it did not do so in its entirety. Elements that went out of use were those that had referents in the immediate social setting, including social actors, the nature and the dynamics of the events, which changed dramatically in the aftermath of the coup. Elements that survived were those that represented beliefs and shared values embedded deeply in local culture. These elements, despite being contested when it comes to their specific referential scope, continued to operate even in a divided and polarized society. 
